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VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 An S corporation (“S Corp.”) is a small business 
corporation that is permitted to have its corporate income, 
losses, deductions, and credits attributed to its shareholders. 
This appeal arises out of nine consolidated cases before the 
United States Tax Court regarding the tax implications of an 
S Corp.’s election to treat its subsidiary as a “qualified 
subchapter S subsidiary” (“Qsub”) under Internal Revenue 
Code § 1361.
1
 Specifically, the parties disagree as to whether 
the Qsub election and subsequent sale of the S Corp. parent 
creates an “item of income” under § 1366(a)(1)(A)2 thereby 
                                              
1
 26 U.S.C. § 1361. All statutory citations refer to the Internal 
Revenue Code unless otherwise noted. 
2
 The relevant portion stating: 
 
In determining the tax under this chapter of a 
shareholder for the shareholder’s taxable year in 
which the taxable year of the S corporation ends 
(or for the final taxable year of a shareholder who 
dies, or of a trust or estate which terminates, 
before the end of the corporation’s taxable year), 
there shall be taken into account the shareholder’s 
pro rata share of the corporation’s— 
(A) items of income (including tax-exempt 
income), loss, deduction, or credit the separate 
treatment of which could affect the liability for tax 
of any shareholder . . . .  
 
6 
 
requiring the parties who held stock in the parent S Corp. to 
adjust their bases in stock under § 1367(a)(1)(A).
3
 For 
reasons which follow, we affirm the decision of the Tax 
Court, finding an increase in stock bases and declared losses 
to be improper. 
  
II. FACTS 
 In June 1997, ten trusts for the benefit of the Ball 
family (“Trusts”)4 acquired direct ownership of all shares of 
                                                                                                     
26 U.S.C. § 1366(a)(1)(A). 
3
 “The basis of each shareholder’s stock in an S corporation 
shall be increased for any period by the sum of the following 
items determined with respect to that shareholder for such 
period: (A) the items of income described in subparagraph 
(A) of section 1366(a)(1) . . . .” Id. § 1367(a)(1)(A).  
4
 The named Trusts are nine of ten total trusts: R. Ball for R. 
Ball III, By Appt.; R. Ball Children Trust 9/9/1969; Ethel Ball 
for R. Ball III Apt. 2/9/1967; Ethel Ball for A.L. Ball as 
Appt.; R. Ball Jr. F/B/O R. Ball III 12/22/1976; R. Ball for A. 
L. Ball By Appt.; R Ball Jr. Children Trust 1/29/1970; R. Ball 
For Children Trust 1/24/1973; Russell Ball Jr. Sec. First 
9/9/1967. The tenth trust has a related case stayed in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania pending this appeal. See R. Ball, Jr. For A. L. 
Ball Trust, December 22, 1976 v. United States, 2:12-cv-921 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2012). For purposes of this appeal, the term 
“Trusts” will include the tenth trust, though not a party, 
except that, in section V of this opinion, our use of the term 
generally refers only to the nine Appellants.  
7 
 
American Insurance Service, Inc. (“AIS”)5 with an aggregate 
basis in AIS stock totaling $5,612,555. In 1999, the Trusts 
formed Wind River Investment Corporation (“Wind River”), 
a Delaware corporation. The Trusts then contributed their 
shares in AIS in exchange for all of the shares of Wind River. 
This resulted in Wind River owning all of the shares of AIS. 
Effective June 4, 1999, Wind River designated itself a 
subchapter S Corporation. On February 28, 2003, Wind River 
elected to treat AIS as a Qsub under § 1361(b)(3).
6
 Prior to 
the Qsub election, the Trusts’ aggregate adjusted basis in the 
Wind River stock was $15,246,099. Following the Qsub 
election, the Trusts increased their bases in the Wind River 
stock from $15,246,099 to a new basis of $242,481,544.
7
  
                                              
5
 AIS is a Pennsylvania corporation. Although it became a 
subsidiary of Wind River, AIS was also the parent company 
of a group of insurance-affiliated corporations. Prior to 
acquiring direct ownership of all AIS shares, the Trusts had 
previously indirectly owned shares in AIS. 
6
 26 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(3). A Qsub is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of a parent S Corp., and as such, “all assets, 
liabilities, and items of income, deduction, and credit of a 
qualified subchapter S subsidiary shall be treated as assets, 
liabilities, and such items (as the case may be) of the S 
corporation.” Id. § (b)(3)(A)(ii).  
7
 The fair market value of AIS’s assets at the time it was 
absorbed by Wind River was $232,848,000 and by 
subtracting the prior aggregate basis of AIS stock of 
$5,612,555, an increase of $227,235,445 results. When this 
increase is added to the prior basis of $15,246,099, a new 
basis of $242,481,544 is arrived at for Wind River. This basis 
increase and its tax consequences are the subject of this 
appeal.  
8 
 
 Following the Qsub election and stock basis 
adjustments, the Trusts sold their interests in Wind River to a 
third party, Fox Paine, on September 5, 2003. After 
transaction costs, this sale yielded $230,111,857 in cash and 
securities in exchange for all of the Wind River stock.
8
 Even 
though they had received $230,111,857 from the sale, the 
Trusts claimed a loss in the amount of $12,247,229.
9
 This was 
calculated as the difference between the amount actually 
received for the sale and the new basis in the Wind River 
stock. The Trusts shareholders’ 2003 tax returns were filed 
citing the aforementioned capital loss. 
  
 The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) determined the 
Trusts should not have increased their bases in the Wind 
River stock to $242,481,544 following the Qsub election. The 
IRS determined instead that a capital gain of approximately 
$214 million had been realized from the sale of Wind River to 
Fox Paine. This resulted in a cumulative tax deficiency of 
$33,747,858 for the nine trusts that have filed appeals in this 
case. Deficiency notices were sent to the Trusts on May 18 
and 19, 2011, stating “the Qsub election and the resulting 
                                              
8
 The amount received individually by the Trusts was divided 
based on percentage of ownership.  
9
 The figures stated for the new basis, sale proceeds, and tax 
loss are totals for all ten trusts. As mentioned above, only 
nine trusts are parties to this suit and, accordingly, the actual 
figures for the new basis and stock sale proceeds are 
somewhat less, being approximately $240,080,978 for the 
new basis and $227,833,750 for the sale proceeds. 
Subtracting one from the other yields the loss of $12,247,228. 
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deemed I.R.C. § 332
[10]
 liquidation did not give rise to an item 
of income under I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1)(A); therefore, [the 
Trusts] could not increase the basis of their [Wind River] 
stock under I.R.C. [§] 1367(a)(1)(A).” (Appendix (“App.”) at 
A373.) The Trusts filed petitions with the United States Tax 
Court seeking a redetermination of deficiencies under the 
jurisdiction of §§ 6213(a) and 7442. The cases were 
consolidated and submitted for decision on stipulated facts, 
under Tax Court Rule 122,
11
 as R. Ball for R. Ball III By 
Appt., et al. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1257, 2013 
WL 452722 (2013). As previously noted, the Tax Court found 
the increase in stock basis and declared loss to be improper. 
 
III. TAX COURT PROCEEDINGS 
 The main issue before the Tax Court and now on 
appeal is whether or not a Qsub election creates an “item of 
income” for the parent corporation under § 1366(a)(1)(A). 
The Trusts relied on their assertion that the election “resulted 
in a gain derived from dealings in property and, therefore, 
                                              
10
 26 U.S.C. § 332. § 332 governs the liquidation of a wholly-
owned subsidiary into its parent corporation. “(a) General 
rule.--No gain or loss shall be recognized on the receipt by a 
corporation of property distributed in complete liquidation of 
another corporation.” Id. 
11
 “Any case not requiring a trial for the submission of 
evidence (as, for example, where sufficient facts have been 
admitted [or] stipulated . . .) may be submitted at any time 
after joinder of issue (see Rule 38) by motion of the parties 
filed with the Court.” T.C. Rule 122(a).  
10 
 
created an item of income under § 61(a).”12 R. Ball, 2013 WL 
452722, at *4. If the election resulted in an “item of income,” 
the new higher bases and resulting tax losses are proper. If it 
did not result in an “item of income,” the increase in stock 
bases and declared tax losses are improper. 
  
 More specifically, before the Tax Court, the Trusts 
argued that the deemed liquidation of AIS was, under § 331, a 
sale or exchange of property creating a realized gain to Wind 
River. They further claimed that gains from dealings in 
property are expressly included in gross income under § 
61(a). They then contended that, although § 332 provides for 
the nonrecognition of that gain, it was still “an item of income 
(including tax exempt income)” under § 1366(a)(1)(A), which 
passed through to them and increased their bases in Wind 
River stock under § 1367(a)(1)(A). To support their position, 
the Trusts raised several contentions to the Commissioner’s 
deficiency finding: (1) their bases were properly adjusted 
pursuant to § 1367(a)(1)(A), (2) the losses were properly 
claimed from the sale of Wind River, and (3) “the Qsub 
election resulted in an item of income pursuant to [§] 
1366(a)(1)(A).” See R. Ball, 2013 WL 452722, at *4. Lastly, 
the Trusts cited United States v. Farley
13
 and Gitlitz v. 
Commissioner,
14
 arguing that the “realized” liquidation gain 
under §§ 331 and 61(a)(3), allowed an increase in basis, but 
                                              
12
 The relevant sections state: “[e]xcept as otherwise provided 
in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever 
source derived, including (but not limited to) the following 
items: . . . (3) Gains derived from dealings in property. . . .” 
26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(3).  
13
 202 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000). 
14
 531 U.S. 206 (2001). 
11 
 
that gain is not taxable under the non-recognition provision of 
§ 332(a). The Commissioner responded to the Trusts’ 
arguments by asserting that the Qsub election did not create 
an “item of income (including tax exempt income)” under § 
1366(a)(1)(A). 
  
 The Tax Court rejected the Trusts’ arguments, relying 
on the differences between “realization” and “recognition” of 
income in determining what constitutes an “item of income” 
under § 1366 as it relates to §§ 1367, 331, 332, and 61(a). R. 
Ball, 2013 WL 452772, at *4-5 (2013). The Tax Court held 
that gain from a Qsub election is “realized” and calculated 
under § 1001,
15
 yet it is not “recognized” due to the non-
recognition provision of § 332. Id. (“Once the amount of the 
realized gain has been calculated, the entire amount of the 
realized gain is recognized unless a Code section provides for 
nonrecognition treatment.”). Furthermore, the Court found, 
under § 1366, that when a gain is unrecognized, it “does not 
rise to the level of income” and is not an “item of income for 
tax purposes.”16 Id. at *7. Finally, the Court distinguished 
Gitlitz and Farley and determined that “neither case is 
squarely on point.” R. Ball, 2013 WL 452722, at *8. The 
Court reasoned that Gitlitz and Farley only established that 
the nature of “discharge of indebtedness” as income is not 
affected by an exclusion elsewhere in the Code. See id. Here, 
                                              
15
 “The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of 
property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair 
market value of the property (other than money) received.” § 
1001(b).  
16
 In addition the Tax Court found no cases in which a Qsub 
election created an item of income for the parent S Corp. R. 
Ball, 2013 WL 452722, at *4. 
12 
 
however, “realized gain from the Qsub election was never 
included explicitly in gross income and was never excluded 
from gross income.” Id. Therefore, the Tax Court determined 
Gitlitz and Farley were unpersuasive in qualifying the Qsub 
election as an “item of income” under § 1366. 17  Id. 
 
 In sum, the Court held that “unrecognized gain 
resulting from the Qsub election did not create an item of 
income or tax exempt income pursuant to 
section1366(a)(1)(A).” Id. at *10. Accordingly, the Trusts 
were found deficient for improperly adjusting their bases in 
Wind River stock following the Qsub election and this appeal 
followed. Id.. 
 
IV. JURISDICTION 
 Section 7482(a) provides exclusive jurisdiction by this 
Court over decisions before the United States Tax Court. Our 
review of the Tax Court’s construction of the Internal 
Revenue Code is plenary. Nat’l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 918 F.2d 426, 428 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
 A. Items of Income 
 As previously noted, the main issue before us is 
whether or not the Qsub election created an “item of income.” 
                                              
17
 The Court also noted that the cases have since been 
overridden by Congressional action amending 26 U.S.C. § 
108(d)(7)(A). Id. at *8; see also Job Creation and Worker 
Assistance Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. at 40. 
13 
 
An “item of income” is required for a shareholder of an S 
Corp. to increase the basis in his or her of the S Corp.. See § 
1366(a)(1)(A).
18
 Despite use of the term “item of income” in 
§ 1366, it is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code and the 
Treasury regulations provide only guidance.
19
 See 26 C.F.R. § 
                                              
18
 “To prevent double taxation of income upon distribution 
from the corporation to the shareholders, § 1367(a)(1)(A) 
permits shareholders to increase their corporate bases by 
items of income identified in § 1366(a).” Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 
209.  
19
 The separately stated items [of income] of the S 
corporation include, but are not limited to, the following 
items— 
 
(i) The corporation’s combined net amount of 
gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital 
assets . . .   
(ii) The corporation’s combined net amount of 
gains and losses from sales or exchanges of 
property . . .  
(iii) Charitable contributions . . .  
(vi) Each of the corporation’s separate items of 
gains and losses from wagering transactions 
(section 165(d)); soil and water conservation 
expenditures (section 175); deduction under an 
election to expense certain depreciable business 
expenses (section 179); medical, dental, etc., 
expenses (section 213) . . .  
. . . .  
(vii) Any of the corporation’s items of portfolio 
income or loss, and expenses related thereto . . .  
14 
 
1.1366-1(a)(2); see also Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 
U.S. 426 (1955).  “Gross income,” however, is defined. It is 
governed by § 61, and includes “[g]ains derived from 
dealings in property,” as well as “[i]ncome from discharge of 
indebtedness.”20 Id. § 61(a)(3), (12). Further, the Supreme 
Court has defined “gross income” as “accessions to wealth, 
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete 
dominion.” Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431. Gains derived 
from the property obtained by electing and liquidating the 
Qsub are claimed by the Trusts to be “items of income” for 
                                                                                                     
(viii) The corporation’s tax-exempt income. For 
purposes of subchapter S, tax-exempt income is 
income that is permanently excludible from gross 
income in all circumstances in which the 
applicable provision of the Internal Revenue Code 
applies . . . . 
 
26 C.F.R. § 1.1366-1(a)(2).  
20
 Other gross income measurements are:  
 
Compensation for services, including fees, 
commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items; 
Gross income derived from business; Interest; 
Rents; Royalties; Dividends; Alimony and 
separate maintenance payments; Annuities; 
Income from life insurance and endowment 
contracts; Pensions; Income from discharge of 
indebtedness; Distributive share of partnership 
gross income; Income in respect of a decedent; and 
Income from an interest in an estate or trust. 
 
26 U.S.C. § 61(a).  
15 
 
the purpose of § 1366.  Fundamentally, the Trusts claim 
there was a gain from liquidation (§ 61(a)), that gain was 
“realized” (§ 331) and calculated (§ 1001), and thus is an 
“item of income” (§ 1366). (Appellant Br. at 17.) The Trusts 
summarily dismiss the effect of non-recognition on whether a 
gain is income; however, this premise is undermined by 
regulations corresponding to § 61(a).
21
 Under the § 61(a) 
Treasury Regulations, gains from the sale or exchange of 
property, including those derived under § 331, are not 
“recognized,” and thus “not included in or deducted from 
gross income at the time the transaction occurs.”22 26 C.F.R. 
§ 1.61-6(b)(1). 
  
 While “item of income” is a broad and undefined term, 
it is not one without limits. § 61(a) provides a “broad 
definition of ‘gross income,’” that is “sweeping [in] scope,” 
unless “excepted by another provision in the tax code.” 
Comm’r  v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1995). The 
Supreme Court concluded that “income” requires an 
                                              
21
 The Trusts state, “[i]n sum, that realized gain is not 
recognized does not alter the fact that the realized gain is 
income . . . .” (Appellant Br. at 18.)  
22
 Appellants assert that the quoted language from 26 C.F.R. 
1.61 -6(b)(1) only addresses issues of timing, namely that 
realized but unrecognized gain is not taken into account when 
the transaction occurs.  They support that assertion with 
examples of income defined under subsections of § 61(a) but 
then subject to nonrecognition treatment elsewhere.  Those 
examples are distinguishable from the gains at issue here 
because the examples of income are expressly provided for 
under § 61(a) and are not analogous to the unique treatment 
of Qsub liquidations under the Code. 
16 
 
“accession to wealth.” Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431. The 
Qsub election did not add wealth, it merely changed the tax 
treatment of the income flowing from the Qsub. This 
reformation by liquidation did not provide an “accession to 
wealth” for the corporation and therefore could not create 
“income” for the Trusts. 
 
 B. Realization and Recognition of Gains 
 The Internal Revenue Code  
defers the tax consequences of a gain or loss in 
property value until the taxpayer ‘realizes’ the gain 
or loss. The realization requirement is implicit in § 
1001(a) of the Code, which defines ‘[t]he gain [or 
loss] from the sale or other disposition of property’ 
as the difference between ‘the amount realized’ 
from the sale or disposition of the property and its 
‘adjusted basis.’ 
 Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991) 
(quoting 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a-b)). “To realize a gain or loss in 
the value of property, the taxpayer must engage in a ‘sale or 
other disposition of [the] property.’” Id. (quoting § 1001(a)).  
The Commissioner and the Trusts differ as to whether 
“realizing” a gain is enough to create an “item of income” 
under § 1366, or whether this section requires the gain to be 
“recognized.” The Tax Court concluded that “nonrecognition 
provisions prevent realized gain from being included in a 
taxpayer’s gross income.” R. Ball, 2013 WL 452722, at *5. 
The Trusts contend that the Tax Court “confused the concepts 
of realization and recognition.” (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 
14.) They argue that the Tax Court reached the 
17 
 
“unprecedented conclusion that because ‘no gain was 
recognized, . . . the unrecognized gain did not create an item 
of income under § 61(a)(3),’ or § 1355(a)(1)(A).” (Id. at 15 
(quoting App. at 24.) The Trusts assert that the “crux of the 
Tax Court’s error” is its determination that “unrecognized 
gain does not rise to the level of income.” (Id.) They argue 
that the Code cannot be parsed to create some realized gain 
that is income and some realized gain that, by virtue of 
nonrecognition, is not. According to the Trusts, realized gain 
is always income, a categorization that does not change if that 
realized gain is then unrecognized.  
 
 Inherent in this conflict is which statutory provision, 
§§ 331 or 332, applies to the liquidation of AIS via Qsub 
election. Section 331, governing “gain or loss to shareholders 
in corporate liquidations,” states “[a]mounts received by a 
shareholder in a distribution in complete liquidation of a 
corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for 
the stock.”  The payment via liquidation is realized and 
calculated by adding “any money received plus the fair 
market value of the property (other than money) received.” 26 
U.S.C. § 1001(b). At this point, the Trusts argue that the 
realized gain becomes an “item of income” by way of § 
61(a)(3) and the Supreme Court’s holding in Gitlitz. Id. § 
61(a)(3) (“[G]ross income means all income from whatever 
source derived, including . . . [g]ains derived from dealings in 
property . . . .”); 531 U.S. at 213. The Trusts argue § 331 
applies to “realize” the gain. The Trusts claim the gain is 
defined in § 61(a) and that it is then calculated under § 
1001(a). The Trusts deem § 332’s non-recognition provision 
to apply only after realization under § 331, without effect on 
whether the gain is an “item of income.” 26 U.S.C. § 331. 
The Trusts position is that this realized but unrecognized gain 
18 
 
is considered an “item of income” and they are permitted to 
increase their bases in their Wind River stock. 
 
 In contrast, the Commissioner claims the gain must 
first be “recognized” to qualify as an “item of income,” and 
the gain in this case is not recognized due to § 332’s non-
recognition provision. Section 332 governs “complete 
liquidations of subsidiaries.” Id. § 332 (emphasis added). An 
S Corp. may elect Qsub status for its subsidiary if “(1) the [S 
Corp.] parent holds 100 percent of the subsidiary’s stock, (2) 
the subsidiary is otherwise eligible to qualify as an [S Corp.] 
on its own, but for the fact that it has a corporate shareholder, 
and (3) the [S Corp.] parent makes the appropriate election . . 
. .” In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d 736, 743 n.6 
(2013) After a Qsub election, for tax purposes, “the 
subsidiary is deemed to have liquidated into the parent under 
I.R.C. §§ 332 and 337.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.1361-4 (2012). Thus, 
“[a] Qsub does not even exist for federal tax purposes.” 
Majestic Star Casino, 716 F.3d at 759. Section 332 then states 
“[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized on the receipt by a 
corporation of property distributed in complete liquidation of 
another corporation.” 26 U.S.C. § 332(a) (emphasis added); 
see also § 337(a) (“No gain or loss shall be recognized to the 
liquidating corporation on the distribution to the 80-percent 
distributee of any property in a complete liquidation to which 
section 332 applies.”).  
  
19 
 
 The Treasury Regulations further distinguish between 
§§ 331 and 332.
23
 “Section 332 applies only to those cases in 
which the recipient corporation receives at least partial 
payment for the stock which it owns in the liquidating 
corporation.”24 26 C.F.R. § 1.332-2(b). 
                                              
23
 The relevant distinguishing language states: 
 
Under the general rule prescribed by section 331 
for the treatment of distributions in liquidation of a 
corporation, amounts received by one corporation 
in complete liquidation of another corporation are 
treated as in full payment in exchange for stock in 
such other corporation, and gain or loss from the 
receipt of such amounts is to be determined as 
provided in section 1001. Section 332 excepts 
from the general rule property received, under 
certain specifically described circumstances, by 
one corporation as a distribution in complete 
liquidation of the stock of another corporation and 
provides for the nonrecognition of gain or loss in 
those cases which meet the statutory requirements. 
 
26 C.F.R. § 1.332-1.  
24
 The regulations further state: 
 
The nonrecognition of gain or loss is limited to the 
receipt of such property by a corporation which is 
the actual owner of stock (in the liquidating 
corporation) possessing at least 80 percent of the 
total combined voting power of all classes of stock 
entitled to vote and the owner of at least 80 
percent of the total number of shares of all other 
20 
 
 Ultimately, the Tax Court rejected the Trusts’ 
arguments under § 331, specifically noting that § 332, which 
governs the liquidation of a subsidiary of which the parent 
corporation owns eighty percent or more, applies here, not § 
331, which governs “all other liquidations.”  R. Ball, 2013 
WL 452722, at *6.  The Court held that a liquidation cannot 
be governed by both § 331 and § 332, thereby foreclosing the 
Trusts’ argument that the gain was first realized under § 331 
and then subject to nonrecognition treatment under § 332.   
 
 The Tax Court is correct. The Trusts fail to address the 
fact that § 332, by its plain text, applies to a special set of 
liquidations that are treated under a different statutory scheme 
and do not create “items of income.” Under the Internal 
Revenue Code, a Qsub election results in a § 332 liquidation.  
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1361-4 (providing that a Qsub election is a 
                                                                                                     
classes of stock (except nonvoting stock which is 
limited and preferred as to dividends). The 
recipient corporation must have been the owner of 
the specified amount of such stock on the date of 
the adoption of the plan of liquidation and have 
continued so to be at all times until the receipt of 
the property. If the recipient corporation does not 
continue qualified with respect to the ownership of 
stock of the liquidating corporation and if the 
failure to continue qualified occurs at any time 
prior to the completion of the transfer of all the 
property, the provisions for the nonrecognition of 
gain or loss do not apply to any distribution 
received under the plan. 
 
26 C.F.R. § 1.332-2(a).  
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deemed liquidation into the parent corporation); 26 U.S.C. § 
332 (covering the complete liquidation of a wholly owned 
subsidiary).  Section 332 applies to the liquidation of a 
“controlled subsidiary” into its parent. Boris I. Bittker & 
James S. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations 
& Shareholders ¶ 10.20 (7th ed. 2006). A Qsub is a wholly 
owned subsidiary under § 1361(b)(3)(B)(i) (“[one hundred] 
percent of the stock of such corporation is held by the S 
corporation.”). 
   
 The Trusts argue that § 332(d) (“Recognition of gain 
on liquidation of certain holding companies”) provides that 
“subsection (a) and section 331 shall not apply to such 
distribution.” 26 U.S.C § 332(d)(1)(A).  This, according to 
them, is proof that the sections are not mutually exclusive, 
because, if they were, there would be no need for the 
exception.  That subsection, however, does not affect the 
analysis of a Qsub liquidation at issue here.  Instead, it 
focuses on “distribution[s] to foreign corporation in complete 
liquidation of an applicable holding company.”  Id.  It is not 
incongruous to say that a Qsub liquidation, governed by § 
1361, is only covered by § 332 but that other liquidations, 
covered by other sections of the Code, may be covered by 
both § 332 and § 331.  Rather, the complexities of 
intersecting provisions should be maintained.  The tax treatise 
cited by both parties states that § 332 is an “important 
exception” to the general rule provided in § 331. Bittker & 
Eustice ¶ 10.20. As such, a liquidation is either governed by 
the general rule in § 331, or it is covered by the exception in § 
332.  As the Tax Court correctly held, “[a] liquidation cannot 
be governed by both.”  R. Ball, 2013 WL 452722, at *6. 
 
 C. Gitlitz and Farley 
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 The Trusts contend, however, regardless of “whether 
or not Sections 331 and 332 are viewed as separate corporate 
liquidation schemes does not alter the result.” (Appellants’ 
Opening Br. at 42.) Rather, the results of Gitlitz and Farley 
and the treatment of gains as income under § 61(a) are 
dispositive. 
 
 The Trusts rely on the holdings of Gitlitz and Farley, 
allowing a discharge of indebtedness to pass through to 
shareholders as an “item of income,” as justification for their 
own “items of income” argument.25 Specifically, the Trusts 
argue that an “item of income” may be defined as gross 
income under one provision of the Code, yet not recognized 
under another provision, and still remain an “item of income” 
for the purpose of § 1366. In Gitlitz, petitioners were 
shareholders of an insolvent S corporation, which realized 
over two million dollars of discharge of indebtedness income 
in 1991.  531 U.S. at 208.  Even after the discharge of 
indebtedness income, the S Corp. was still insolvent and so 
the entire discharge of indebtedness was excluded from gross 
income under §§ 108(a) and 108(d)(7)(A).  Id. at 209-10.  On 
their tax returns, the Gitlitz petitioners increased their bases in 
the S corp.’s stock by their pro rata share of the discharge of 
indebtedness income under the theory that the discharge of 
indebtedness income was an “item of income” that was 
passed through to the taxpayers under § 1366(a)(1)(A).  Id. at 
210.  The petitioners in Gitlitz then used the increased bases 
to deduct their total losses. Id. The Supreme Court agreed, 
finding “[that] section [1366] is worded broadly enough to 
include any item of income, even tax-deferred income, that 
                                              
25
 The Trusts state “[t]his case falls squarely within Gitlitz 
and Farley.” (Reply Brief at 9.)  
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‘could affect the liability for tax of any shareholder.’” Id. at 
216 (quoting § 1366(a)(1)(A)). 
 
 This Circuit in Farley issued a similar, and even more 
expanded, holding. 202 F.3d at 206.  
 
We hold that because the controlling statutes 
clearly provide that tax attribute reduction takes 
place after income has passed through the S 
corporation to its shareholders (pass through being 
a necessary prerequisite to “determin[ing] the tax 
imposed by this chapter for the taxable year of 
discharge”), in the case of an insolvent S 
corporation, discharge of indebtedness income that 
is excluded from gross income by section 108(a), 
passes through to the shareholders, increases the 
shareholder's basis in their S corporation stock, 
thus allowing the shareholders to take deductions 
for S corporation losses suspended under section 
1366(d)(1). 
Id. The Supreme Court in Gitlitz acknowledged that all “items 
of income” need not qualify as gross income and the 
indebtedness in Gitlitz still was “income” as included under § 
61(a)(12).  Id. at 213. In contrast to Gitlitz, a similar inclusion 
under § 61(a) is not present in the “gain” in the appeal before 
us. See Nathel v. Comm’r, 615 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“The argument ignores the crucial difference between Gitlitz 
and this case: Gitlitz addressed payments that explicitly were 
included in gross income under § 61(a).”). Rather, the “gain” 
under § 61(a) is not recognized nor is it income, and thus it 
cannot be an “item of income.”  
24 
 
 The Tax Court noted that any conclusion other than a 
holding that “unrecognized gain from a Qsub election does 
not constitute an item of income or tax-exempt income under 
§ 1366(a)(1)(A),” would lead to “absurd results” and “open 
the door to a myriad of abusive transactions.”  R. Ball, 2013 
WL 452722, at *9-10. The Supreme Court in Gitlitz, 
however, refused to address this policy argument when the 
text of the Code was clear.  Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 220 (“Because 
the Code’s plain text permits the taxpayers here to receive 
these benefits, we need not address this policy concern.”).  
Although statutory text cannot be read in a way that creates 
an absurdity, the payment of some taxes and not others is not 
an absurdity, but rather a policy choice rightly left to 
Congress.  Id. Indeed, Congress, subsequent to Gitlitz, made 
changes to the statute at issue in that case to prevent further 
uses of the tax code loophole.
26
 
                                              
26
 See supra note 17. “As a general matter, the Committee 
believes that where, as in the case of the present statute under 
section 108, the plain text of a provision of the Internal 
Revenue Code produces an ambiguity, the provision should 
be read as closing, not maintaining, a loophole that would 
result in an inappropriate reduction of tax liability.” H.R. Rep. 
No. 107-251, at 52 (2002). Congress provides a further 
illustration of why the change, similar to issues presented on 
appeal. 
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 Interconnecting these regulations demonstrates that the 
gain is not recognized and under the definition of the 
Supreme Court is not income, and therefore if not income, 
cannot be deemed an “item of income” under § 1366. In sum, 
the S Corp. shareholders could not increase their bases under 
§ 1367. The Trusts fail to cite any authority for the 
alternative.  
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Order of 
the Tax Court. 
                                                                                                     
To illustrate these rules, assume that a sole 
shareholder of an S corporation has zero basis in 
its stock of the corporation. The S corporation 
borrows $100 from a third party and loses the 
entire $100. Because the shareholder has no basis 
in its stock, the $100 loss is “suspended” at the 
corporate level. If the $100 debt is forgiven when 
the corporation is in bankruptcy or is insolvent, the 
$100 income from the discharge of indebtedness is 
excluded from income, and the $100 “suspended” 
loss should be eliminated in order to achieve a tax 
result that is consistent with the economics of the 
transactions in that the shareholder has no 
economic gain or loss from these transactions. 
 
Id.  
